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O P I N I ON  
   
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is a petition for review of the BIA’s denial of a 
motion to reopen Emerald Nkomo’s removal proceedings.  
Nkomo was ordered removed after she was convicted of 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud.  While her removal 
proceedings were pending, her husband, a United States 
citizen, filed a Form I-130 petition for Alien Relative on her 
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behalf.  The government did not decide that petition until after 
the BIA had issued a final order of removal.  At that point, the 
government granted the I-130 petition.  Nkomo moved to 
reopen her removal proceedings to request additional relief, but 
the BIA denied her motion.  She contends that the BIA erred 
in not considering whether she was entitled to equitable tolling.  
Because Nkomo sufficiently put the BIA on notice that she was 
raising an equitable tolling claim and because the BIA 
considered the issue, we will vacate the BIA’s order and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. FACTS 
 Emerald Nkomo came to the United States from 
Zimbabwe in 1985 and became a lawful permanent resident in 
1992.  In March 2017, she was convicted of conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud, an aggravated felony, and DHS initiated 
removal proceedings against her.  Nkomo applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture.    
 
While those proceedings were pending, Nkomo’s 
United States citizen husband, Joseph Witkowski, filed an I-
130 Petition for Alien Relative on her behalf.  Because 
Witkowski was incarcerated, it was difficult for him to attend 
an interview with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Service (USCIS).  The IJ granted a continuance of Nkomo’s 
removal proceedings so that Witkowski could attend the 
interview.  In January 2018, Nkomo’s counsel contacted DHS 
to inform it that the IJ had adjourned Nkomo’s proceedings 
until February 22, 2018, to allow time for adjudication of the 
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I-130 petition.1  DHS confirmed that it would require 
Witkowski to attend the interview in person.      
        
While the I-130 petition was still pending, the IJ denied 
Nkomo’s removal objections.  The BIA affirmed.  After the 
Supreme Court decided Pereira v. Sessions,2 Nkomo moved to 
remand, arguing that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction 
because she was given a defective notice to appear.  The BIA 
denied the motion, and we affirmed.3 
 
DHS did not set a date to interview Witkowski about the 
I-130 petition.  It was not until Nkomo petitioned for a writ of 
mandamus in federal district court in February 2019 that DHS 
finally scheduled an interview for March.  Nkomo attended the 
interview, but Witkowski’s presence was waived because he 
was in federal custody.  DHS granted the I-130 petition.   
 
With the approved I-130 petition in hand, Nkomo 
moved to reopen her removal proceedings so that she could 
apply for relief under INA § 212(h).  She argued that changed 
circumstances warranted reopening because, despite her 
numerous requests, the relief she sought had not been 
available earlier due to the refusal of USCIS to conduct an 
interview and adjudicate the petition.  She emphasized the 
government’s delay.4  She contended that she was likely to 
succeed on the merits of a petition under INA § 212(h) and that 
she could show extreme hardship.  She also asked for 
reopening based on exceptional circumstances because of the 
 
1 AR 38. 
2 585 U.S. ___ , 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). 
3 Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 131–32 (3d Cir. 2019). 
4 AR 14. 
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government’s delay.     
 
The BIA denied the motion to reopen as untimely 
because it was filed more than ninety days after the Board’s 
removal order.  The BIA noted that no exceptional 
circumstances justified sua sponte reopening.  The BIA 
concluded, “Finally, to the extent the respondent is seeking 
reopening in light of certain equities, including her long 
presence in the United States and potential hardship to her 
family, we do not have the authority to grant relief solely on 
equitable or humanitarian grounds.”5  
 
 Nkomo petitioned for review.  She asserts that the 
Board erred because it failed to consider whether she was 
entitled to equitable tolling of the ninety-day period for 
reopening.  The government responds that we lack jurisdiction 
to consider this issue as Nkomo failed to raise it before the 
BIA, and it is therefore unexhausted.6 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
We have jurisdiction over a petition for review of “the 
Board’s denial of a motion to reopen a removal proceeding.”7  
Because Nkomo was convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) limits our jurisdiction to 
 
5 AR 3. 
6 Relatedly, the government argues that the BIA did not err in 
failing to address equitable tolling because Nkomo did not 
raise the issue.  Because this substantially overlaps with the 
exhaustion issue, we do not address this argument separately. 
7 Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 147 (2015). 
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“constitutional claims or questions of law.”8  We review the 
BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen “under a highly deferential 
abuse of discretion standard.”9  Typically, the BIA’s decision 
to deny a motion to reopen sua sponte is “functionally 
unreviewable” because we lack a “meaningful standard” for 
review of the BIA’s “essentially unlimited” discretion.10  
Nevertheless, we retain jurisdiction to “review the BIA’s 
reliance on an incorrect legal premise.”11  Application of the 
equitable tolling standard “to undisputed or established facts” 
is a question of law that we review de novo.12  
 
The government argues that Nkomo’s failure to exhaust 
her equitable tolling claim independently bars our jurisdiction.  
Nkomo offers two arguments in response:  (1) she sufficiently 
put the BIA on notice of her equitable tolling claim, and (2) the 
BIA addressed equitable tolling sua sponte.  We address each 
in turn.   
 
A. Nkomo put the BIA on notice of her equitable tolling 
claim. 
A noncitizen must exhaust her claim before the BIA for 
 
8 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D).  
9 Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2011). 
10 Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
11 Id.  
12 See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. ___ , 140 S. Ct. 
1062, 1067 (2020); Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
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this Court to have jurisdiction over the claim.13  Our exhaustion 
policy is “liberal.”14  As we have held. “so long as an 
immigration petitioner makes some effort, however 
insufficient, to place the Board on notice of a straightforward 
issue being raised on appeal,” he meets the exhaustion 
requirement.15  A petitioner need not even file a brief before 
the BIA as long as his notice of appeal sufficiently “place[s] 
the BIA on notice of what is at issue.”16  And although “we 
will not require the BIA to guess which issues have been 
presented and which have not,”17 the petitioner is not required 
to state precisely the alleged error.18  
 
Although Nkomo’s brief was less than precise, she did 
enough to raise the issue of equitable tolling before the BIA.  
She requested reopening because of “a significant change of 
circumstance.”19  Although changed circumstances in the 
context of motions to reopen often refer to a statutory exception 
 
13 Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2005). 
14 Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 465 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2006). 
15 Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2005). 
16 Bhiski v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2004); see also 
Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding 
that exhaustion is met if the issue is in the notice of appeal but 
not the brief before the BIA). 
17 Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 122 (3d Cir. 2008).   
18 See, e.g., Yan Lan Wu, 393 F.3d at 422 (finding a petitioner’s 
claim exhausted even though she “did not explicitly argue that 
the Immigration Judge erred in considering only her airport 
interview” but “contend[ed] in her Notice of Appeal that the 
Immigration Judge’s conclusion [was] not supported by 
substantial evidence within the record”). 
19 AR 13. 
8 
 
to the ninety-day deadline for changed country conditions 
related to asylum,20 the BIA in this case should have been on 
notice that the “changed circumstance” Nkomo referred to was 
her I-130 petition and that she was requesting equitable tolling. 
   
Any doubt that Nkomo was requesting equitable tolling 
should have vanished given the facts she presented.  A 
petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the ninety-day 
deadline for a motion to reopen “only if he shows ‘(1) that he 
has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented 
timely filing.”21  Nkomo argued before the Board that she 
repeatedly requested USCIS schedule an interview and decide 
her I-130 petition, that USCIS waited eighteen months to 
schedule an interview, and that USCIS did not do so until she 
filed a writ of mandamus in federal court.  This type of factual 
setting is relevant to an equitable tolling analysis.   
 
True, Nkomo did not mention “equitable tolling” by 
name, but a petitioner is not required to recite “magic words . . 
. or even cite[] to the relevant case law regarding an issue.”22  
Nkomo requested reopening of her proceedings outside the 
ninety-day period for “changed circumstances” and recited 
facts showing that the delay was through no fault of her own.  
This showing was sufficient to put the BIA on notice of her 
 
20 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 
21 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace 
v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).  Equitable tolling 
applies to the statutory deadline for filing motions to reopen.  
See Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 400-01 (3d Cir. 2005). 
22 Zhi Fei Liao v. Att’y Gen., 910 F.3d 714, 718 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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equitable tolling claim. 
 
B. The Board raised equitable tolling sua sponte. 
 Even had Nkomo failed to raise equitable tolling before 
the BIA, her claim would be exhausted because the Board 
considered the issue on its own.  A claim is exhausted if the 
Board considers the issue sua sponte.23  Although we have 
declined to “specify the precise limitations of [the] rule,” we 
noted in one case “that the BIA issued a ‘discernible 
substantive discussion on the merits.’”24     
 
 Here, the BIA noted that “certain exceptions” to the 
ninety-day filing requirement were not relevant.25  And, after 
rejecting Nkomo’s motion to reopen as untimely, the BIA 
concluded its opinion by stating that “to the extent the 
respondent is seeking reopening in light of certain equities, 
including her long presence in the United States and potential 
hardship to her family, we do not have the authority to grant 
relief solely on equitable or humanitarian grounds.”26  The 
BIA’s suggestion that it does not have the authority to make 
decisions on equitable grounds is perplexing.  The BIA has 
authority to equitably toll the deadline for motions to reopen—
 
23 Lin, 543 F.3d at 123–24. 
24 Id. at 126 (quoting Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 
1122 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
25 AR 3. 
26 AR 3 (citing Matter of Medina, 19 I. & N. Dec. 734, 742 
(BIA 1988)).  Nkomo mentioned hardship to her family 
because extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen relative is one way 
to succeed on the merits of a petition for waiver of 
inadmissibility.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). 
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the precise relief Nkomo sought.   
   
 Because Nkomo properly raised equitable tolling before 
the BIA, the BIA erred in failing to consider her request for 
equitable tolling on the merits.  We remand for the Board to do 
so in the first instance.27 
 
III. CONCLUSION   
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Nkomo 
exhausted her equitable tolling claim before the BIA.  We will 
grant Nkomo’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of her 
motion to reopen, vacate the BIA’s order and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
27 See Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 2006). 
